US presidential election impact: Region by region

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The recent 2024 US presidential election concluded with Republican Donald Trump winning the presidency over Democrat Kamala Harris. This victory, along with significant Republican gains in the Senate, indicates a shift in the political landscape and sets the stage for substantial policy changes. Neither party has currently attained a majority in the House of Representatives, although the Republican Party has gained a net two seats and looks likely to win a majority.

With Republicans flipping key Senate seats, including those in Ohio and West Virginia, they now hold a majority, which will facilitate the passage of Trump's policy agenda. Although they do not have a filibuster-proof majority, their control is significant enough to influence major legislative decisions.

As the new administration takes shape, the ripple effects of the election are set to reshape international relations. From enhanced military support in the MENA region to economic uncertainties in Latin America, SSA, APAC, and Europe, the global landscape is poised for change. Stakeholders across these regions may navigate these shifts by adapting to new policies and the evolving dynamics of US foreign relations.

We look at the potential impact region by region.

Latin America

If implemented, the new US administration's planned restrictions on immigration will have significant impact on Latin America in the one-year outlook. This impact includes the loss of remittances and potential US restrictions on aid and trade as leverage tools to encourage host countries to develop tighter migration controls. If US deportations lead to reduced remittances, this would have most significant impact on Central American countries, where remittances represent up to 30% of GDP.

Argentina and El Salvador will be among the likely allies of the new US administration, with both likely to seek US support in their negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Bilateral relations are likely to deteriorate with Colombia, Brazil and other left-leaning governments, especially if sanctions increase and tariffs are imposed on Latin American exports to the US.

Ecuador, Brazil, Bolivia and Argentina would be the most exposed to the US imposition of import tariffs, as they do not have US free trade agreements.

Europe

The incoming US administration is likely to reintroduce import duties and non-tariff barriers that would impact strategic segments including electronics and motor vehicles, dampening GDP growth. This could be mitigated by expansionary US fiscal policy that stimulates demand for imports.

Climate-related policies signed or supported under the presidency of Joe Biden are likely to be rescinded, hindering elements of EU progress on green transition.

Mediation efforts between Russia and Ukraine are likely to be prioritized over the provision of military or financial aid, with the new US administration likely to exert pressure on both to negotiate a settlement. The likely inability of Ukraine's other allies to fully replace decreased US support would move the longer-term direction of the war in Russia's favor.

The US will be likely to limit its commitment to NATO, most probably involving reduced numbers of troops stationed in member states and scaling back US participation in NATO exercises and summits.

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Middle East and North Africa

US regional diplomacy under a Trump presidency will be focused on preventing a wider escalation involving Iran and the Arab Gulf states and securing ceasefires in Israel's wars against Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, with the intention of facilitating normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel.

While likely averse to the large-scale deployments of US troops to the MENA region or extended military operations, Trump would likely use airpower against regional adversaries such as the Houthi in Yemen where he deems that US strategic interests or national security are threatened.

A confrontational policy toward Iran is likely to primarily use financial sanctions and covert action rather than direct military action to exert pressure on Iran to reenter negotiations around its nuclear program.

US security guarantees for the protection of Gulf states and their littoral waterways are likely to remain in place but be increasingly contingent on transactional dynamics and trade policies determined by strategic competition.

The US will continue to contest the influence of mainland China in investment and partnership in hi-tech and security sectors for the Gulf monarchies.

Trump's administration will likely increase US economic and military support for Egypt and would likely support negotiations with the IMF if Egypt's main sources of foreign currency revenue are further undermined in 2025.

Asia-Pacific

Strategic competition between the US and mainland China is very likely to intensify, with focus on trade practices, industrial policies, national security interests and international diplomacy.

Multiple Asia-Pacific countries are likely to face higher US tariffs on trade, reduced US commitments for climate finance and potential reduction in security guarantees from the US, although US security cooperation will likely continue via the Quad — Australia, India, Japan, and the US — and AUKUS, a trilateral security partnership between Australia, the UK, and the US.

Realignment of global supply chains, both within the Asia-Pacific region and between Asia and other zones, is likely to intensify, primarily in response to Trump's planned tariff increases on mainland China.

Under Trump's tariff and tax policies, US monetary policy is likely to remain tighter for longer while the US dollar is likely to strengthen, implying an increased risk of depreciation for many Asia-Pacific currencies. That, in turn, would increase the cost of imported energy and other commodities priced in dollars.

Sub-Saharan Africa

A stronger US dollar would be implied by inflation-boosting tariffs that force the US Federal Reserve to previous policy-rate easing cycle. The resulting depreciation of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) currencies will raise the cost of imported goods including essential staple items. That would likely increase inflation within the SSA region, hindering efforts to lower SSA policy interest rates and increasing the risk of large-scale social unrest.

African trade, especially textiles; fruits, nuts and coffee; and assembled cars will also be dependent on whether the US renews the long-established African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) trade treaty, which has granted African states preferential access to the US, or instead moves to bilateral treaties prioritizing countries exporting materials deemed strategically important by the next US administration.

Reductions in US aid programs like those proposed in the first Trump administration would risk substantial adverse impacts, notably affecting countries that rely heavily on aid and agricultural development programs.

While SSA countries may enjoy some benefits — such as Chinese redirection of exports initially targeted to the US market — and stronger efforts by BRICS countries to expand their trade and investment footprint, the overall impact of expected US tariff policy is likely to prove adverse for likely SSA growth. We are lowering our 2025- 29 forecast by 0.2 percentage point.

Watch our video roundup of events our risk analysts are watching in November

This article was published by S&P Global Market Intelligence and not by S&P Global Ratings, which is a separately managed division of S&P Global.