Upcoming Zimbabwean elections
The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission has set 30 July for the holding of the country's first presidential and parliamentary elections since the resignation of Robert Mugabe as president in November 2017.
- A win by the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in the election will likely see continuity in policy with the implementation of the 10-point economic transformation plan, which includes requirements for pre-export value addition in the agricultural and mining sectors and measures to open up the economy to FDI.
- President Emmerson Mnangagwa is highly likely to assume an increasing central role in policymaking and, although he is a proponent of indigenisation policies, the new administration's approach to implementation is likely to be less stringent than the Mugabe-era policies.
- Violent confrontations between rival political demonstrators from the opposition MDC Alliance and ZANU-PF numbering hundreds and using stones and sticks are highly likely, posing risks of injury to passers-by and commercial property and causing transport disruption in Harare and Bulawayo.
Zimbabwean President Emmerson Mnangagwa announced to the media on 30 May that the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) has set 30 July for the holding of the country's presidential and parliamentary elections. The elections are the first to be held following the removal of long-serving president Robert Mugabe in the November 2017 army-led palace coup, ending the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)'s internal succession battle. Following his swearing in as president on 24 November 2017, Mnangagwa moved quickly to consolidate power by appointing a new 22-member Cabinet made up of his allies, with the support of the military.
Despite some successes such as recovering USD250 million (out of an estimated USD1.2 billion) of illegally externalised funds, the president's power consolidation is being marred by internal fractures. Media reports indicate a growing schism between the military and the civilian section of ZANU-PF, with the latter accusing the military of dominating government and usurping control of the party. Between 29 April and 1 May, the selection of candidates at party primaries was marred by various violent incidents following disputes over the internal polls, in which some sitting parliamentarians and cabinet ministers were defeated by newcomers in a poll supervised by the security establishment.
Issues on reform agenda
Mnangagwa launched the ruling party's 2018 election
manifesto on 4 May; priorities include seeking to tackle
corruption, promoting foreign direct investment (FDI), especially
in mining, increasing value-added manufacturing and
agro-processing, and enacting pro-business reforms under a new
investment law. It also includes removing employment quotas while
re-engaging with the international community to unlock financing to
ease Zimbabwe's liquidity crisis under the new 'Zimbabwe is Open
for Business' policy. In the key mining sector, the ZANU-PF
administration is seeking to increase output and revenue from
diamonds and platinum exports and other gemstones. The maximum 51%
local-ownership requirement for all businesses except for those
extractive firms mining diamonds and platinum has been abolished as
of April 2018, and on 1 June the government dropped a proposal in
the Mines and Minerals Amendment Bill requiring mining companies to
list most of their shares on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE).
Additionally, the government is likely to continue its
rapprochement efforts with international financial institutions,
including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the African
Development Bank in meeting numerous milestones, particularly for
IMF funding including compensation for past expropriations.
Opposition prospects
The transfer of power to Mnangagwa and the narrow
eight-week window to the July elections is likely to be utilised by
opposition parties, particularly the Movement for Democratic Change
(MDC Alliance) led by 40-year-old Nelson Chamisa, to seek
concessions over stalled electoral reforms, including independent
auditing of the biometric voters' register and transparent data
transmission of results. On 5 June, the MDC Alliance staged largely
peaceful protests in the capital, Harare, with over 1,000 people
participating, demanding to know the company contracted to print
the ballot papers and accusing the ZEC of conniving with the
military to rig the elections in favour of the ruling ZANU-PF. The
MDC Alliance has witnessed deepening splits following the death of
its long-serving leader Morgan Tsvangirai in February, weakening
its electoral prospects against a resurgent ZANU-PF. The internal
fracturing of the MDC Alliance, triggered by succession battles in
response to the ailing health of Tsvangirai, is further compounded
by a lack of financial resources to run an effective electoral
campaign.
Outlook and implications
The main obstacle to Mnangagwa winning his first term in
office proper is likely the recurring schism between the military
and the civilian sections of ZANU-PF, despite recent moves by the
ruling party to put its house in order by addressing such concerns.
A win by the ZANU-PF in the July elections, which is highly likely,
will see continuity in policy with implementation of the 10-point
economic transformation plan, which includes pre-export
value-addition in the agricultural and mining sectors and policies
opening the economy to FDI. Mnangagwa is highly likely to assume an
increasing central role in policymaking and, although he is
proponent of indigenisation policies, the new administration's
approach to implementation is likely to be less stringent compared
to the Mugabe-era policies. The amendments to the Indigenisation
and Empowerment Act and announcement of compensation for farmers
whose lands have been expropriated are indicative of the broad
agenda towards legislative and policy reform. A lower-likelihood,
higher-impact scenario of a revitalised MDC Alliance win, possibly
driven by worsening socioeconomic conditions and broader political
discontent, is unlikely to lead to significant change in policy
orientation as the MDC favours opening the country up to FDI,
modernising agriculture, the mining industry, and seeking the
return of skilled Zimbabweans of the diaspora.
In the run-up to the polls, violent confrontations between rival political demonstrators from the MDC Alliance and ZANU-PF using implements such as stones and sticks are highly likely to occur, posing risks of injury to passers-by. This is also likely to cause damage to commercial property around party offices in the central business district of Harare and Bulawayo, and include road blockades lasting up to five hours. Additionally, violent protests particularly in opposition strongholds such as Bulawayo in Matabeleland North Province are likely in the immediate aftermath of the polls, growing in intensity and scope in the two-week window but eventually subsiding. The security forces are likely to respond by using water cannon and tear gas to disperse rioters. Indicators of improving government-opposition relations would be Zimbabwe welcoming international observers led by the European Union and the Southern African Development Community and the outcome of their independent assessment of the polls. Finally, a post-election reshuffle by President Mnangagwa is likely to indicate the degree of government determination to proceed with current economic reforms, and its willingness not to bow to popular pressures such as recent demands for pay increases by public workers such as nurses and doctors.