Islamic State in Libya
The Libya wilaya (province) of the Islamic State has re-established itself by consolidating its logistical bases in southern Libya from where it is likely to plan a new terrorist campaign against forces loyal to the two Libyan rival governments.
- There are increasing indications that the Islamic State has established a stronghold in the southern Libyan desert that is enabling the group to increase its operational capabilities by attracting new recruits and accumulating weapons.
- This logistics base is allowing the Islamic State to mount increasingly regular hit-and-run operations across the south of the country aimed at securing funds, weapons, and military vehicles.
- The group's strategy is likely to expand the geographical reach of its operations and mount a new terrorist campaign focused on high-profile government and security targets in Tripoli, Misrata, and in the east.
On 31 December 2018, Libyan National Army (LNA) southern units, including the 10th Infantry Brigade and the Khalid bin Walid Battalion, raided a number of agricultural projects near the southern village of Ghudwah (60 km south of Sabha) as they were pursuing a group of armed Chadian militants suspected of using the area as a logistic base. The operation came in response to an attack on the barracks of the LNA's 10th Infantry Brigade in Taraghin (140 km south of Sabha) on 27 December, in which three LNA soldiers were killed, that at the time was blamed on Chadian opposition groups. During the operation, however, LNA forces found and rescued 22 civilians, abducted by the Islamic State during raids on the southern villages of Fuqaha and Tazerbu in November 2018.
Pushed by the first discovery, LNA forces launched a wider combing operation in the area, during which they also discovered a large warehouse containing large quantities of explosives and used to produce 'sticky' improvised explosive devices (IEDSs), vehicle-born IEDs, suicide vests. The raids on the agriculture projects coincided with two separate suicide bombers attacking and blowing themselves up inside the Ghudwah police station. The first attack resulted in no casualties, while the second is reported to have caused three deaths and left four people injured. According to Libyan media, one of the assailants had been captured in the Ghudwah farm by local residents and later taken to the police station.
Logistics base
According to Libyan eastern authorities, most of the suicide vests
and VBIEDs used by the Islamic State in its major terrorist
operations in Tripoli since mid-2018 had been manufactured in the
Ghudwah bomb-making facility. These operations include the 2 May
2018 double suicide attack that targeted the High National Election
Commission office; the 10 September 2018 assault on the
headquarters of Libya's National Oil Corporation; and the 25
December 2018 suicide attack on Libya's foreign ministry, which
killed three people and wounded at least 21. This suggests that,
almost two years after the group's expulsion from its Sirte
stronghold, the Islamic State has managed to establish logistics
infrastructure in southern Libya and is gradually recovering its
former military capabilities. This logistics base is allowing the
Islamic State to mount increasingly regular hit-and-run operations
in mostly isolated and rural areas across southern Libya aimed at
securing funds, weapons, and military equipment, of which the 27
December 2018 attack on the LNA barracks in Taraghin is one
example, and the attack on Tazerbu police station on 23 November
2018 is another. The increasing number of civilians and political
figures kidnapped by the group also indicates that the Islamic
State is seeking to secure funds through the payment of
ransoms.
Influx of veteran fighters
The Islamic State continues to benefit from the fractured Libyan
political and security landscape to remain an effective relevant
actor, despite its aspiration to governance ending in Sirte in
December 2016. The group's ranks have been reinvigorated by the
arrival of veteran foreign jihadists from Syria and Iraq. The
hostages rescued in Ghudwah, for instance, stated that they were
kidnapped and later interrogated by armed men variously speaking in
Iraqi, Syrian, Tunisian, and Yemeni dialects. Although the presence
of foreign fighters in the ranks of the Islamic State in Libya has
been a constant, there are increasing indicators suggesting that
the long-expected transfer of foreign fighters from the Levant
towards Africa is now in motion. Similar dynamics have also been
observed in Algeria and Nigeria.
Outlook and implications
The Islamic State's ability to re-establish itself in southern
Libya, coupled with the ease by which it has been able to transfer
militants and weapons into Tripoli and penetrate through highly
secure locations there, indicate the group has managed to
infiltrate or co-opt criminal and smuggling groups to maintain the
security of its operational networks and supply lines. The fact
that the LNA raid in Ghudwah came about by chance, rather than
actionable intelligence, also indicates that the Islamic State's
logistics base in southern Libya is unlikely to have been
significantly degraded, given the group's use of mobile training
camps and warehouses in unpatrolled desert areas in the Fezzan. IHS
Markit assesses that the group is in the process of planning a new
terrorist campaign against forces loyal to both of the rival Libyan
administrations, with the most likely targets including government
and security buildings in Benghazi, Bin Jawad, Misrata, Sirte, and
Tripoli; prisons with the aim of freeing detained fellow militants;
embassies (several Western countries are ready to re-open in
Tripoli); foreign NGO offices, and other sites frequented by
foreign nationals. The group is also likely to co-operate with
criminal gangs to stage bank robberies and kidnap-for-ransom of
politicians and businessmen, a risk likely to extend to foreign
workers at energy sites, especially around the Murzuq basin. Key
indicators of increased risk include the emergence in the group's
arsenal of more powerful VBIEDs using armored trucks, weaponized
drones to target LNA barracks and checkpoints, and unclaimed
assassinations targeting moderate imams.